961NEWS – أخبار لبنان

Since February 3, the city of Homs has been under a sustained, and increasingly heavy, bombardment by the Assad regime’s forces. According to reports in the last couple of days, the regime has sent armored reinforcements, and residents are expecting an imminent ground assault.

However, that Assad loyalists had to bombard the city for nearly a month without sending in ground troops tells us something about the state of the Syrian Armed Forces as well as about its performance in operations against militias in built-up areas. To that end, there’s much that could be learned from the Assad regime’s 1978 campaign against Christian urban strongholds in Lebanon—a battle known as the 100-days war.

Unlike its previous assaults on Daraa, Hama, Zabadani and Deir al-Zour, at various points over the last several months, the regime’s forces have not been able to enter and hold Homs, even temporarily. Instead, Assad’s troops have laid siege to the city and have been shelling it from the outskirts for three weeks straight.

The regime’s tactics in Homs bear resemblance to the ones it used in East Beirut—especially Achrafieh—in the summer and fall of 1978. Back then, much like today, the forces of Bashar al-Assad’s father, Hafez, employed field artillery, tanks, heavy mortars (including 240mm mortars, also used today in Homs), and multiple rocket launchers, deployed around the city, to savagely bombard civilian neighborhoods in an attempt to break the will of the Christian militias and punish their supporters.

However, despite its brutal bombardment, and despite vastly outnumbering the Christian militias in East Beirut—15,000 to 20,000 Syrians to several hundred Christian militiamen defending their neighborhood—the Syrian Arab Army was unable to enter and take the city. The reasons for this failure are instructive.

Its numerical superiority notwithstanding, the Syrian army was not prepared to risk high casualties. In fact, reports from the period indicate that the Syrians had estimated a potential loss in excess of 3,000 men had they pressed ahead with a full invasion of Achrafieh. Already, following several engagements with the militias, the Syrians had sustained more casualties than they were willing to accept.

The militias were able to inflict such damage partially due to the employment of certain weapons, especially anti-tank systems and anti-aircraft guns converted for anti-personnel use. By contrast, despite the heavy shelling and the siege of the city, leaving them with limited amounts of ammunition, the militias sustained low casualties, and were able to maintain mobility through the use of tunneling.

Despite various dissimilarities between the Christian militias and the local Syrian opposition militias in terms of training and military support from a neighboring state, the experience of the former says much about how an urban setting can serve as a force multiplier for a small force with the right training and equipment.

Indeed, despite a severe shortage in ammunition and lack of access to proper weapons systems, the Free Syrian Army (FSA) has managed to present the Syrian regime with many of the same challenges it faced more than three decades ago in Beirut.

For instance, YouTube footage has surfaced showing the FSA using Russian-made anti-tank systems against fixed positions, on top of the good use it has made so far of RPGs against armored units.  If the US and its regional allies were to provide it with better systems, advice and training, the FSA’s capabilities would multiply significantly. As it is, with their very modest means, the defectors have managed to impose severe constraints on the abilities of the regime’s forces.

The regime has relied on loyal Alawite brigades (such as the 4th Division) for its ground assault operations. On the one hand, this denies the regime the ability to launch multiple simultaneous operations. On the other hand, it means that the number of reliable units is rather limited, which makes the regime, much like in Achrafieh in 1978, very wary about inordinate casualty levels. An additional dilemma facing the regime today includes an overstretched, poorly trained military constantly threatened by defections among rank-and-file Sunnis, and, thus, reluctant to enter in direct battles in the streets of cities like Homs.

For instance, Jonathan Littell, who was in Homs reporting for Le Monde, has noted how “the Army seems afraid to attempt to enter neighborhoods.”  Littell added that while the heavy bombardment has killed many civilians, its impact on the capacities of the FSA has been limited—much like what happened with the Christian militias in Achrafieh in 1978. In addition, as Littell observed, the FSA believesthat direct engagement with infantry units would result in even more soldiers defecting to the rebel side.

We will soon find out if Assad intends to follow his barrage with a ground incursion, and what will ensue as a result. However, even if the regime manages to enter Homs, the FSA is likely to slip out and reemerge in other cities. Take, for instance, how the regime has entered and reentered Daraa several times already. And yet, resistance continues to resurface there, forcing the regime to redeploy its already strained and stretched military. There are simply too many hotspots to deploy to, and, as Littell observed, defections are increasing with every passing day. Furthermore, as Jonathan Spyer has reported, there are a number of areas in the northern Idlib province that are virtually regime-free.

Ultimately, there’s one fundamental thing in common between Hafez al-Assad’s failure in 1978 and his son’s failure today. Thirty-four years ago, when his vicious assault on East Beirut was over, Assad had neither broken the will of the militias, nor inflicted heavy casualties upon them. Likewise today, despite the unspeakable horror unleashed on Homs, its people continue to come out in defiant protests – inspiring their compatriots to do the same in virtually every town and city in Syria.

Tony Badran is a research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. He tweets @AcrossTheBay.

The Arab League upped the ante on Sunday. It scrapped its futile observer mission to Syria, recognized the Syrian opposition and even went as far as calling for the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force to end the “vicious cycle of violence.” But in Lebanon, another cycle, one that could be equally vicious, has started to gather alarming momentum, and the fear in Beirut is that the Syrian regime has finally activated its plan to open a new front in the neighborhoods of Tripoli, Lebanon’s volatile northern capital.

Because nothing happens by accident in Lebanon, especially when it comes to simmering tensions between its many religious groups. One of the most dangerous feuds in recent years has been in Tripoli between the Alawites of Jabal Mohsen and the Sunnis of Bab al-Tabbaneh. The sectarian animosity has in the last few days witnessed a worrying level of violence with the deaths of at least three people and the deployment of the Lebanese Special Forces. The area is a Petri dish containing a culture of the region’s most dangerous tensions. It is one that the Syrian regime, helped by its Lebanese allies, has put in a warm and fertile corner of its fiendish laboratory.

There was always the fear that if pressure on Damascus reached critical levels—if the opposition were seen to be in the ascendancy—then the Assad regime would sow instability in Lebanon and use any ensuing unrest to show the world the dark consequences of its downfall.

It tried this tactic before. In 2007, the Nahr al-Bared uprising was almost certainly coordinated by a Syrian government still smarting from its forced departure from Lebanon in 2005. Then, the government of Saad Hariri did not hesitate to commit troops to crush the insurgency. It came at a tragic price—the deaths of over 170 Lebanese soldiers—but the state had acted. (Even if Hezbollah, the so-called defenders of Lebanese sovereignty, sat by and did nothing.) However, today the government is hewn from different timber, and it remains to be seen if it is prepared to quell the fighting.

Bottom line: The Lebanese government must once again act in the best interests of its people. As Kataeb bloc MP Samer Saadeh said on Monday, “The Syrian crisis will be reflected on Lebanon if the cabinet does not order the army to enter all regions and take control of all weapon warehouses.” If Prime Minister Najib Mikati doesn’t take action, he will not only have lost whatever credibility his government has left, but he could be responsible for igniting a touch paper that could very easily plunge the nation into conflict. It’s that simple.

And while we are on the subject, Mikati must rein in (perhaps even fire) Foreign Minister Adnan Mansour, whose defense of the Syrian regime (and his condemnation of the Syrian opposition) at the Arab League meeting on Sunday would have us believe that he is nothing short of a spokesman for Damascus. If so, where does that leave the government?

Mansour should do his job and represent his country’s best interests by supporting all actions that are needed to stabilize the situation in Syria, especially those that will reduce pressure on Lebanon. Advocating non-action as he did by saying that it would “put the country in a dark tunnel” goes beyond his remit. One wonders where his allegiances truly lie.

Sadly, it doesn’t matter how many commando regiments are sent north, if the state does not act, the shameful conclusion we must draw is that the government is in cahoots with Damascus as part of a wider plan to ensure its survival. Lebanon’s policy of not interfering in Syrian affairs is clearly an elastic concept.

Rafik Hariri, a self-made businessman was the Prime Minister of Lebanon from 1992 to 1998 and again from 2000 until his resignation on 20 October 2004. He headed five cabinets during his tenure. Hariri played a leading role in the reconstruction of Beirut. He opened many local and regional businesses. In addition, he founded The Islamic Foundation for Culture and Higher Education in 1979 in Sidon which later became known as the Hariri Foundation. Hariri worked towards rebuilding Lebanon, the unity of the different religious and ethnic groups. Background Information He was born to a Lebanese family of modest means in the Lebanese port city of Sidon; Hariri attended elementary and secondary school in his city and pursued his business administration studies at the Beirut Arab University. He had a brother, Shafic, and a sister, Bahia.

After training as a teacher he left Lebanon in 1965 to work as a teacher in Saudi Arabia and then went on to work for a construction company. There he married Nazik Audeh in 1965 and they had seven children together. In 1969, Hariri established his own construction company CICONEST. In 1978 Hariri was made a citizen of Saudi Arabia by the Saudi royal family. He then went on to become Saudi Arabia’s leading entrepreneur, acquiring Oger in 1979, and founding Oger International, which is based in Paris. His interests extended across banking, real estate, oil, industry and telecommunications.

In 1993 he founded the television station Future TV in Beirut and purchased stakes in several Lebanese newspapers. He founded his own newspaper Al-mustaqbal (The Future).

Political Career Hariri returned to Lebanon in 1992 as prime minister where he served from 1992 to 1998, then again from 2000 until late 2004. However, he served as a Member of Parliament since 1996 until his assassination in 2005.

Establishment of Hariri Foundation Hariri’s contributions were numerous. Among the most notable is the fact that he educated 33,000 Lebanese students inside and outside of Lebanon, and spent hundreds of millions of dollars of his own personal money to redefine the face of social hierarchies in Lebanon. He supported charity, along with a number of non governmental institutions, and finally aiding in various investments in the country.

In addition, Hariri bought Lycee Abdel Kader in 1985, as well as the Anglican School in 1986. He pledged on keeping them as schools, however he added social and educational programs onto them. He founded Rafik Hariri High School III in 1998 as well as the Hariri Canadian University in Mechref in 1999 where more programs are being established. Distinctions, Medals and Awards Rafik Hariri was awarded numerous medals and awards in his lifetime, some of which are:

Chevalier de la Légion d’Honneur (1981)

Chevalier of the Italian Republic (1982)

Cedar National Medal / Rank of Commandor (1983)

Saint Peter and Saint Paul Medal (1983)

Save the Children 50th Anniversary Award (1983) Medal of King Faysal (1983)

Médaille de la Ville de Paris (1983)

Golden Key of Beirut City (1983)

Chevalier des Arts et des Lettres (1983)

Officier de la Légion d’Honneur (1986)

Doctor Honoris Causa of Boston University (1986)

Docteur Honoris Causa de l’Université de Nice (1988)

Doctor Honoris Causa of the Arab University of Beirut (1994)

Goldaen Key of Sao Paolo City / Brazil (1995)

Medal of the Liberator of Argentina – General José St. Martin (1995)

Prix Louise Michel – France (1995)

Doctor Honoris Causa of Georgetown University – Washington USA (1996)

Grande Croix de la Légion d’Honneur (1996)

The Grand Cordon (1996)

The Order of Diplomatic Service Merit Grand Gwang Hwa Medal – Korea (1997)

Doctor Honoris Causa of the University of Ottawa, Canada (1997)

Doctor Honoris Causa of the University of Montreal, Canada (1997)

Le Grand Collier du Trône – Morocco (1997)

Cavalier du Gran Croce (1997)

Al Nahda medal, First Category, Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (2001)

Medal of Honor of the Arab Union / The Arab Union of Veterans Associations (2001)

“Star of Romania” at the rank of “The Grand Cross” (2002)

Union Medal / Republic of Yemen (2002)

Honorary Doctorate in Humane Letters, Lebanese American University, Beirut, Lebanon (2003)

Orient Doctorate Degree, Moscow State Institute for International Relations (2003)

UN-HABITAT Scroll of Honor Special Citation for Post Conflict Reconstruction / World Urban Forum, United Nations – Barcelona, Spain (2004)

King Faysal International Award for Serving Islam, equally with the Islamic Bank for Development (2005)

Tipperary International Peace Award (2005)

Assassination in 2005 (by Israel)

On 14 February 2005 Rafik Hariri was killed, along with 21 others, when explosives equivalent of around 1,800 kg of TNT were detonated as his motorcade drove near the St. George Hotel in Beirut. Among the dead were several of Hariri’s long time companions and his friend and former Minister of the Economy Bassel Fleihan. Rafik Hariri was buried along with his companions near Mohammad Al Amine Mosque in downtown Beirut. After his death, Beirut International Airport was renamed Rafik Hariri International Airport in his honor along with the Beirut General University hospital which was renamed Rafik Hariri Hospital. And finally, Hariri Foundation became Rafik Hariri Foundation where the same spirit and vision will be carried forward by his colleagues.

Gun battles in the north city of Tripoli, which killed two people and wounded 17 Saturday, resumed Sunday between the pre-dominantly Alawite neighborhood of Jabal Mohsen and the mainly Sunni district of Bab al-Tabbaneh in the northern city of Tripoli.

One of the wounded from Saturday’s clashes included a teenage girl who is in critical condition. The Lebanese Army, which stepped in Friday to stem the violence, saw at least six of its members wounded.

Shooting echoed Sunday throughout the rival neighborhoods, known for sporadic violence due to sectarian and political divisions.

The clashes that flared up three days ago have raised concerns that the crisis in neighboring Syria might spill over into Lebanon.

Foreign Affairs Minister Adnan Mansour, in an interview with the Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Rai published Sunday, acknowledged that events in the north were likely linked to the crisis in Lebanon’ neighbor.

“I believe that the security incidents in north Lebanon are no doubt a result of the prevailing situations in Syria and north Lebanon,” Mansour said.

Meanwhile, Mufti of Tripoli and North Lebanon Sheikh Malek Shaar, in an interview with local An-Nahar newspaper published Sunday, said there would be no final solution to the problem in Tripoli until the city was demilitarized.

“There will be no final solution as long as there are weapons allowed and there are people brining in hundreds of thousands of ammunition to the north,” Shaar told the daily.

“The state has to take the situation under control so that there are no more arms outside its jurisdiction.”

Shaar also called for a meeting between Muslim scholars in the north in a bid “to determine the northern region’s position regarding several issues, particularly events in Syria.”

“It would then not be permissible for any Muslim scholar to give an opinion that contradicts the main principles we would agree on,” Shaar told the local newspaper.

Lebanon’s Grand Mufti Sheikh Mohammad Rashid Qabbani described Saturday the clashes as worrisome and as an attempt to incite strife.

“He urged the Lebanese Army to swiftly place the area under its control and put an end to the violence in a bid to strengthen civil peace and national unity,” Qabbani’s press office quoted him as saying Saturday.

He also warned against similar security breaches, which he said could impact negatively on the situation in the country.

Security sources told  that the Lebanese Army had been ordered to arrest on sight anyone carrying weapons and patrols, both on foot and in military vehicles, are ongoing in the Bab Al-Tabbaneh and Jabal Mohsen areas. -With additional reporting by Dana Khraiche and Thomas El-Basha